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CONFISCATION OF THE PROPERTY OF TECHNICAL
ENEMIES
By RUDOLF M. LITTAUER t
ON larch 11, 1942, the President established the office of Alien
Property Custodian and authorized the Custodian to take over all kinds
of property of certain non-resident foreign nationals.' Since that day
this officer has seized, through more than 2200 vesting orders, a great
number of alien property rights of a very considerable aggregate value.
The most important part of the Custodian's holdings consists of more
than 40,000 alien-owned patents and patent applications' which are
said to comprise "some of the finest research achievements in modem
science" and to represent "the largest block of patents in the United
States." '
The Custodian's policies with regard to these patents and patent ap-
plications deserve our closest attention, primarily because of their con-
nection with recent proposals to reform patent laws and to eliminate
patent cartels,4 but just as much because of the destructive effect which
they will have upon the rights of the former patent owners. These
policies have been formulated in a detailed report published by the
Custodian early in 1943 under the title Patents at I ork. In his report
the Custodian states that "national policy clearly dictates that this Gov-
ernment should seize" all enemy patents and patent applications in order
to turn them "to the advantage of all its citizens." ' To that end he
offers to make enemy patents available to any legitimate American manu-
facturer on a non-exclusive basis, royalty free, and for the life of the
.patent. 6 MIoreover, the Custodian's report indicates that all enemy vested
patents are to remain "a permanent possession of the American people," -
that is, they will be permanently confiscated. The same policy is pursued
with respect to enemy patent applications. The Custodian declares his
intention to publish them "thus making these inventions part of the
t Member of the New York Bar.
1 EX~.v ORDR No. 9095, 7 Fwa. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended by Ex c. Onru:r
No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942), dated July 6, 1942.
2. OWI Release No. 2171, July 9, 1943.
3. PATEzTS AT NVoas (U. S. Alien Property Custodian 1943) 1.
4. Bom=n AD WkLsn, GzmsIAY's AsTmR PLAz (1943); Rrroar To T1Z Nt,-
To (U. S. Office of Facts and Figures); Callmann, Patent License Agree:cnts (1940)
28 GEo. L. J. 871.
5. PATEN--s AT Voan (U. S. Alien Property Custodian 1943) 5.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Id. at 11.
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common body of knowledge of the community," ' and thereby destroy-
ing their patentability for all time, not only in the United States, but
wherever published inventions are not patentable.
The Custodian's powers over alien property reach a remarkably wide
group of owners which is far from homogeneous in character. Not
all of its members, although presumably the majority, are enemies in the
common sense of this word-persons who are residents of an enemy
country and who owe allegiance to the enemy. Many are assumed to
be enemies because they are subject to the enemy's control and influence,
although they have been placed in that position against their own will,
as the result of an adverse fate or of acts of aggression perpetrated upon
them by the enemy himself.
The most important group among these technical enemies is composed
of the residents of enemy occupied countries, such as Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia
and Greece. The American property holdings of these people are sub-
stantial; rights owned by them amount to more than one-third of the
vested patents and patent applications. The Custodian visualizes the
peculiar position which this minority occupies. He has acknowledged
that he is aware of "a great measure of responsibility which he owes
to these unfortunate people," "o and he has stated that it is his duty
to safeguard their rights. Nevertheless he has not found it possible to
follow this duty and to preserve the value of their property. For in
his opinion "these sufferers from axis aggression would not have us
do less than turn their patent rights into an active weapon of warfare
for the defeat of their oppressors." " Acting on these assumptions,
the Custodian decided that except in one respect, he should treat their
patents no differently from those of enemy nationals proper. He has
offered these patents to American licensees, royalty free and on a non-
exclusive basis, but he has limited the royalty free period to the duration.
of the war and six months thereafter. Simultaneously, he has offered
to agree with licensees on royalty rates for the rest of the term of the
patents and to establish such rates on the basis of commercial prac-
tice.12 He has finally added that the ultimate disposal of the patents
would be "the subject of discussions with the governments in exile." 13
Three governments in exile-Norway, Belgium and Holland-, fail-
ing to see eye to eye with the Custodian in this matter, have filed notes
of protest with the State Department which inquire "why the patents
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 6-7.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 11.
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of nationals of countries unfortunate enough to have them occupied by
the enemy should be exploited during wartime without compensation,
whereas American citizens whose patents have been taken over for war
purposes are receiving full compensation."' 4 And they further complain
that many patents owned by their nationals have been taken over al-
though they have no connection at all with the war effort. Both these
arguments are persuasive indeed.
Apart from the nationals of enemy occupied countries, we find a number
of other groups of technical enemies who have been classified as enemies
by definition of the statute only. These groups also consist of various
kinds of property owners who stand a good chance of regaining their prop-
erty at some time after the war when the need for its public administration
has ended. Their exact definition will have to await Congressional action
after the end of the war. But it can already be foreseen that Congress will
want to restore, for example, the rights of all those whom the statute con-
siders as enemies solely because they happened to be caught in Germany at
the outbreak of the war, be they American citizens or allies of this country,
or neutrals. Moreover, Congress will undoubtedly want to free property of
enemy enterprises which are actually owned by our own nationals, our
allies, or neutrals. And Congress may want to follow the example set
after 1918 and free the property of all those who live in territorics
which Germany may have to cede after the war. Congress may want
to go further. It may, for example, decide that Austrians, or at least
some of them, should be placed on an equal footing with Czecho-
slovaks or other later victims of German aggression.' Neither would
it be amiss to consider that Congress may want to make a distinction
in favor of those German nationals who are the enemy's most cruelly
persecuted victims and to whom it must seem a bitter irony to find them-
selves treated as our enemies. When the time arrives for Congress to
take action of this kind, it will find that to a very large extent its de-
cisions have been anticipated by the Custodian in a manner unfavorable
to prospective claimants. For we need hardly say that their chances of
recovery will be greatly reduced once the Custodian has carried out
his publicly announced policies.
The three governments which filed protests with the State Department
based their objections primarily on the violation of certain treaty pro-
visions. The Norwegian Government, for example, could refer to a treaty
of friendship and commerce between this country and Norway, which
provides that each country will grant to the nationals of the other "that
degree of protection that is required by international law" and that "their
property shall not be taken without due process of law and without pay-
14. N. Y. Times, May 13, 1943, p. 4, col. 8.
15. Brief for Austrian Action, Inc., as amicas curiae, United States ex rd. Schwartz-
kopf v. Uhl (decided Aug. 18, 1943, Second Circuit Court of Appeals).
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ment of just compensations." 10 All three governments could refer to the
General Multilateral Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty 17 which is even more in point. That Convention provides that
patents of the nationals of the contracting parties shall "enjoy the ad-
vantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to
their own nationals." 18
International treaties tell only part of the story. Of much greater im-
portance is the fact that international law in general, aside from any
treaty provision, is also commonly held to prohibit the confiscation of
private property. 9 This last proposition has been emphasized by a number
of American opponents of the Custodian's policies who have joined the
protests voiced by the refugee governments.2 The same position was
finally taken by the American Bar Association in a set of resolutions
adopted by its House of Delegates.2 '
The simple and unequivocal denunciation of confiscatory policies found
in international law is not present in the treatment of enemy property
under domestic law and the Constitution. On the contrary, there is an
unbroken line of oft-quoted decisions, the language of which seems to
indicate that administrative agencies, if they are granted sufficient powers
by Congress, may do with enemy property what they please.22
There is, therefore, an apparent conflict of authority. A group of
writers, fixing their view on international law, denounces the confiscation
of alien property as an illegal act, and their opinion, proper as it may be
from their given viewpoint, seems to be in complete discord with the cor-
responding rules existing in the domestic sphere of the law. It requires
little analysis to conclude that a situation of this kind may easily create
very serious difficulties. A government agency which makes use of the
apparent freedom given to it by the municipal law, may well expose this
country to very considerable claims for redress and indemnity which de-
16. 47 STAT. 2136, 2137 (1928). For an analysis of this treaty, see testimony of
Francis Deak, Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 32, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) 59.
17. Ratified and proclaimed by the United States on June 2, 1934, 53 SAT. 1748
(1934).
18. Id. at 1752.
19. See p. 748 infra.
20. See Borchard, Nationalization of Enemy Patents (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 92; Som-
merich, Recent Innwvations in, Legal and Regulatory Concepts as to the Alien and His
Property (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 58; Turlington, Vesting Orders under the First War
Powers Act, 1941 (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 460.
21. AMERICAN BAR AssociAxxoN, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTODY AND
MANAGEMENT OF ALIEN PROPERTY (1943) 42.
22. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft, 300 U. S. 115 (1937);
Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U. S. 298 (1926); Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (U.
S. 1870) ; Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch. 110 (U. S. 1814) ; United States v. Chemi-
cal Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), modified, 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
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rive from international law. Moreover, the discrepancy between the two
prevailing sets of rules may create the uncomfortable feeling that the
norms of our municipal law do not live up to the demands of justice and
equity which have been recognized elsewhere.
But the differences between international law and municipal law in this
field, although they may exist to some extent, are not as wide as they
seem; and confiscation of property, at least of those who are not enemies
in the common sense of that term, is just as much disapproved by the
municipal law as it is by the law of nations. It is the purpose of this article
to demonstrate the validity of this proposition.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In earlier days the enemy and his propert, were subject to harsh and
simple rules. The Roman law permitted any private person to appropriate
to himself such enemy property as he might find. 4 This rule continued
during the Middle Ages. The only change to which it was subjected was
that the right of appropriation shifted from the individual to his sovereign.
Later on when commercial intercourse began to develop from country to
country, some kind of reciprocal protection was worked out for the bene-
fit of foreign traders and their wares.2 ' This reciprocal protection still
survives in commercial treaties which customarily provide that in case oi
war enemy nationals may have a certain period of time within which to
leave the country and take their property with them.
20
In the seventeenth century a number of legal philosophers set them-
selves the task of developing principles which should govern the inter-
course of nations. The foremost representative of their school was Hugo
Grotius.2 7 His work on the law of nations contains an extended dis-
cussion of the treatment to which enemy property should be subjected.
He admits that both tradition and practice allow complete confiscation.
However, he condemns this tradition and urges that no confiscation
should take place if it will violate "the rules of piety and morality." 23 A
century later the same thought was expressed in a more forceful manner
by the philosophers of rationalism and particularly by their foremost
representative, Rousseau. His demand to discontinue the old practice was
based on an appeal to reason. He claimed that reason compelled dis-
23. This article will not deal with those objections to the legality of the Custodian's
policies which derive from specific problems of the patent law. See Wille, Govzrtnmcnt
Ozwnership of Patents (1943) 12 FoRDHA L. R-v. 105.
24. D. 41. 1. 5. 7.
25. MAGNA CHAIrA (1215) ; and other statutes cited in GAT iIrs, L':rxT, o:zAL
LAW AND Aa!EIUCAN TnrvrlsNr OF ENEM;Y PRoPzrY (abr. ed. 1937) 1.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Gnorsus, DE JuRa BE.Iu Ac PAcds (1625).
28. 3 id. at 4, 9.
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tinguishing, in the course of warfare, between enemy combatants and
those who did not engage in hostilities. "War is no relation of man to
man, but one of government to government. The individual is an enemy
only by accident, not as a human being, nor as a subject, but as a soldier;
not as a part of his country, but as its defender." 20 This distinction con-
formed to a certain extent with the changes in Europe's social structure
which had taken place since the end of the Middle Ages. The sovereign
had become the absolute monarch who owne& and personified his country;
war could be and was said to be his personal affair which he settled with
the sovereign who had become his enemy, while his subjects, and the sub-
jects of his enemy, were peaceful citizens continuing to be engaged in the
pursuit of their trade and living and leaving the fight to him and his stand-
ing armies. The duty of the citizen was to keep quiet; his reward was
that he could hope to be treated as an innocent bystander.
During the Revolution the American States concerned themselves little
with these European teachings. Most of them adopted confiscation acts
and seized the considerable properties of Tories and Englishmen which
they found in their territories.30 After the end of the war, however, a
new and different policy was initiated which was destined to form the basis
of a consistent treaty practice pursued by this country tip to the present
time. This policy was inaugurated by Alexander Hamilton. The Jay
Treaty, which he negotiated with Great Britain in 1794,11 provided that
neither country would confiscate, during a war, private property of the
other's citizens. This provision was supplemented by the treaty with
Britain of 1803 32 in which the United States agreed to pay $30,000,000
to British subjects by way of adjustment of their claims arising from
acts of confiscation committed during the Revolutionary War. -lamil-
ton's Camullus letters 33 contain an elaborate justification of the new poli-
cy. He thought that whenever a government grants permission to foreign-
ers to acquire property within its territory, it distinctly promises protection
and security; "for to make individuals and their property a prey of war-
fare is to infringe every rule of generosity and of equity and to add
cowardice to treachery." " Moreover, he felt that the property of for-
eigners within a nation's territory pays valuable consideration for its
protection and exemption from forfeiture because "that which is brought
29. RoussEAu, SocIAL CONTRAcT (1762) c. 4. Cf. Griswold v. Waddington, 15
Johns. (N. Y. 1818) 57, aff'd, 16 Johns. (N. Y. 1819) 438.
30. Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation during the American Revolution (1908) 3
ILL. L. REv. 81; Turlington, Treatment of Enemy Private Property in the U. S. before
the World War, 22 Am. J. INT. L. 270 (1928).
31. 8 STAT. 116, 124 (1867).
32. GATHINGS, op. cit. supra note 25, at 24, citing 5 ANNALS OF CoNc. 969, 1269
(1798).
33. 5 HAMILTON, WORKS (Lodge ed. 1898) 160, 412-18.
34. Id. at 417.
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in has as a rule enriched the revenue and is liable to the Treasury."
Finally, he maintained that property brought into a territory is a deposit
andothat society is a trustee which must not breach the faith lodged in it.
These three new points translate Rousseau's distinctions into the lan-
guage of classical capitalism. Economic stability, necessary for the de-
velopment and security of capital investment, must be fully guaranteed
in peace and in war; governmental power must be reduced to contractual
terms which cannot be lawfully abrogated. Hence the alien who has
brought his property into the country before the war is held to have made
an agreement With the government which survives a declaration of war.
Brown v. United States
During the war of 1812 the new policy found some measure of recog-
nition. In Brown v. United States " a federal court had condemned, as a
prize of war, certain English property found on American soil. The
United States Supreme Court held that no authority existed by which
this act could be justified. The Court admitted, as a matter of general
principle, that warring nations still have the ancient power to confiscate
enemy property wherever found, but it held that "the mitigation of this
rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times had intru-
duced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of the right." -7
Hence the Court held that Congress must be given an opportunity to decide
whether and to what extent confiscation is required in a given instance and
that no confiscation can be permitted unless and until Congress has spoken.
This ruling was subsequently supported by Chancellor Kent who held
that the confiscation of enemy property, in general, is "condenined by the
enlightened conscience and judgment of modern times." .
Confiscation Act of 1862
Congress made no use of the mandate which Brown -v. United States
had given it until the time of the Civil War when it adopted the Cunfisca-
tion Act of 1862." This statute was entitled, "An Act to Suppress In-
surrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate the
Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes." The first four sections
of the Act established a number of new crimes and made provisions
35. Ibid.
36. 12 Cranh 110 (U. S. 1814).
37. HAm ILx, op. cit. supra note 33, at 509.
38. 1 Commentaries *3, *65. See also United States v. Percheman, 7 Put. 51, 86
(U. S. 1833): "The modern usage of nations, which has becume law, would be vio-
lated; that sense of justice and right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civi-
lized world would be outraged, if property should be generally confiscated and private
rights annulled."
39. 12 STAT. 589 (1862).
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for the liberation of slaves. The fifth and sixth sections, applying to
rebel property, could have been drafted by Rousseau himself. Their
language made it clear that Congress intended to confiscate only the
property of persons who by overt acts of treason had made themselves
active and direct participants in the rebellion. Section 5 stated that "to
insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it [should] be the
duty of the President of The United States to cause the seizure of all
estate and property . . . of the persons . . . named in [the] section, and
to apply.and use the same and the proceeds thereof for the support of
the army of the United States." 4 The list of persons which followed
consisted of the highest executives of the Confederate States, their judges
and legislators, other office holders of the Confederate States who took
office or gave an oath of allegiance after the date of secession, officers of
the Confederate Army, and owners of property situated in the loyal ter-
ritory who were engaged in aiding and abetting the rebellion. Section
6 added one more group which consisted of all property owners wherever
their property was situated, who continued to aid and abet the rebellion
after having been ordered to return to their allegiance to the United States.
The Supreme Court in Miller v. United States 4' upheld the statute in a
decision which discussed both its constitutionality and its relation to inter-
national law. This decision found that the confiscation of enemy property
was a proper exercise of the so-called war powers of Congress. The war
powers were said to derive from the express constitutional grant of power
to declare war,42 which "involve [d] the power to prosecute it by all means
and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted." " One
of these means was held to be the seizure and confiscation of all property
of an enemy and the right to dispose of it at the will of the captor. Tihe
Court added that any uncertainty with respect to the existence 'of this
right would be set at rest by the additional express grant of power to
"make rules respecting capture on land or water.? 44
International law entered the opinion in a roundabout way. Since the
war to which the statute applied was a civil war, enemies were also citi-
zens, even though in a state of rebellion. Hence it became necessary to
decide whether their property was protected by the due process and just
compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that the
Fifth Amendment did not apply. It based its opinion on the fact that
rebellious citizens, because they were actively engaged in warfare against
their country, had placed themselves beyond the application of the munici-
pal law and thereby had lost the protection of the Fifth Amendment
40. Id. at 590.
41. 11 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870).
42. U. S. CONST. Art. VIII, § 11.
43. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305 (U. S. 1870).
44. Ibid.
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which is but a part of the municipal law. "War existing, the United States
were vested with belligerent rights in addition to the sovereign powers
previously held. Congress had then full power to provide for the seizure
and confiscation of any property which the enemy or adherents of the
enemy could use for the purpose of maintaining war against the Govern-
ment." 45
The Court left no doubt that these extra-municipal "belligerent rights"
are part of the law of nations. The defendant had made this assertion,
and he had added that the law of nations concerning the confiscation of
enemy property did not apply to rebels. The Court admitted that if the
Confiscation Act "direct[ed] the seizure and confiscation of property nut
confiscable under the laws of war, [they could not] yield it to our as-
sent," 46 and one of the justices, who dissented on another point, added
that "war powers [had] no express limitation in the Constitution and the
only limitation to which their exercise was subjected was the law of
nations." " On the basis of that law the Court found that rebel property
could be confiscated.
hnternational Law Before 1914
The policies pursued by Congress in 1862, even though they were
limited in scope to those enemies who had committed hostile acts, can
well be said to represent an exception to the general attitude prevailing
during the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century. In America, no
action was taken against alien property in the War of 1812, in the Mexican
War of 1848, and in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In Europe,
Napoleon and the English took each other's property in the cuurse of a
full-fledged economic war which lasted until 1813. Subsequently, how-
ever, no example of confiscatory action can be found on that Continent.
In 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, William of Prussia expressed
the attitude of the era succinctly by stating, "I am at war with the French
soldier and not with the citizens of France. The latter will, therefore,
continue to enjoy the absolute security of their persons and property." 4"
In this country international relations were constantly based on a de-
sire to protect property in the case of war. The United States entered
into numerous treaties which provided for a period of time within which
an enemy national could leave the country with his propert3,.4 9 Moreover,
there was some reason to assume that the Hague Convention which was
45. Id. at 306.
46. Id. at 310.
47. Id. at 315.
48. SCHULZ, PRIVATIGEN1TU.N i BEsTZTEN uNiD UoExisrzu FEm ,ELAi.D (1919)
16.
49. Giso~., ALI ExS AND Tn Lw (1940) 29, 16S; Turlington, supra nute 3U, at 273
et seq.
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ratified by the United States together with twenty-two other countries
outlawed the confiscation of enemy property altogether. Section 46 of the
regulations respecting warfare on land, adopted at the Hague in 1907,
provided that "the honor, the right of the family, the life of the individual,
and private property, as well as religious convictions and the exercise of
religious services [were to be] respected. Private property cannot be
confiscated." 50 It was merely doubtful whether this provision referred
to enemy property in general, or only to property seized by a conquering
army.
Towards the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, American
writers on international law could rely onl a century of forebearance and
on an equally long period of continued treaty practice and could con-
clude that private property of enemies was inviolable. 1
The First World War
In the very first days of the first World War the doctrine of the in-
violability of enemy property broke down completely. It became immedi-
ately apparent that the old distinction between peaceful citizens and com-
batants was no longer as persuasive as it had been fifty years before.
Non-combatants were now beginning to assume a military importance of
their own. Many millions of them, men and women, were drafted to
supply and support the people's armies that marched onto the battlefields.
Alien property, too, had acquired new significance. During the preceding
decades the economic relations of the great commercial and industrial
nations had expanded in a manner which former generations could hardly
have envisioned. Previously, alien property holdings had consisted print-
arily of the warehouses and stocks of a few international traders and
only occasionally of industrial and financial investments. Now the ex-
pansion of markets for manufactured products, the world-wide expansion
of patent protection, the corporate device, international banking and fin-
ance, and numerous related factors, had led in many countries to the
development of powerful economic positions in the hands of foreign
nationals.
In 1914, German business had acquired a strong position in the City of
London, in various English industries, and in many parts of the British
Empire. England could not but fear that these interests, if left tinder the
control of the enemy, or in the hands of those whom the enemy had ap-
pointed as managers, would not be available for the British war effort,
50. Regulations Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land, HAGUE CON-
VENTION OF 1907, Annex, § 46.
51. BENTWICH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR (1906); BORCHAIRW, Tnu
DIPLOMATIC PROTEcTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915) 113; 20 I'PENIEIN,, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 1921) 157; Turlington, loc. cit. supra note 30.
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but, on the contrary, would be used to the advantage of the enemy. It
became, therefore, inevitable that the English should immediately provide
for the sequestration and public administration of enemy property. The
English courts supported this action.52 The Hague Convention was found
to be inapplicable. 3 As the war went on, England did not remain satis-
fied with a mere sequestration of enemy property and proceeded to sell
and liquidate it. Other countries followed England's example.
When the United States entered the war, it did not hesitate to take
similar action. On October 6, 1917, Congress adopted the Trading with
the Enemy Act."4 This statute, in the form which it assumed by the
amendment of March 28, 1918,. ' followed the English example by author-
izing the sequestration of enemy property as well as other far-reaching
measures against such property.
Public Management. The statute, as originally enacted in 1917, provid-
ed solely for the seizure and holding of enemy property by an Alien
Property Custodian. The powers of the Custodian were restricted to those
of a common-law trustee. ' He could manage the property in the interest
of the United States and of those who would ultimately become entitled
to it. The reasons for measures of this kind had become apparent even
before modern economic conditions made them a necessity. In Miller v.
United States,57 the Court had emphasized that depriving an enemy of
property within reach of his power impairs his ability to resist and fur-
nishes his opponent means for carrying on the war. In 1917, proof of
these assertions could be seen everywhere. The German firm of Oren-
stein and Koppel which had been engaged in the business of installing
railroads inside American plants had turned over to the Berlin authorities
various maps of these plants. German fire insurance companies had done
the same with industrial maps obtained by their American subsidiaries.
The Bosch Company, a manufacturer of electrical apparatus, was said
to have taken war orders in order to injure the allies by passive resistance.
The Hamburg-American Line and the North-German Lloyd had kept
records of cargo movements for the benefit of the German Navy. Other
firms had cornered the market in coal tar products and thereby hampered
the manufacture of ammunition. In short, it was found that "large por-
tions of the property formerly in the hands of German investors had had
definitely hostile effects upon the interests of the United States." "s No-
52. Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K. B. 857.
53. Id. at 874.
54. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §616-18 (1940).
55. 40 STAT. 459 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., § 12 (1940).
56. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., § 12 (1940).
57. 11 ,Vall. 268 (U. S. 1870).
58. See United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d,
1925), vodified, 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
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thing was easier to defend than the decision of Congress to oust the mana-
gers of German property from their positions and to see to it that the use
of this property in the interest of the war effort was safeguarded, that
espionage and passive resistance were prevented. Nothing could be said
to be "more appropriate to the effective carrying on of war than to
seize and thus render impotent the money and property . . . owned by
alien enemies." 5'
The Custodian's position as a common-law trustee required him to
preserve the substance of all seized enemy property. He had no right to
sell it, except to prevent waste or otherwise to protect the property and the
interests of the United States and the yet unknown ultimate owner. In
effect, this provision granted the Custodian considerable power. He could
sell goods which might not endure until after the war; he could sell prop-
erty which by reason of the war, and even as a consequence of his seizure,
had become unproductive, as for example, business organizations which
had become unable to obtain raw materials or had lost their supplies or
their customers, or required new managements, manpower, or credit facili-
ties, without being able to obtain them.
Whatever the Custodian may have been authorized to do under these
provisions, he could do nothing confiscatory in character. On the contrary,
the Act expressly preserved possible claims of the enemy owner for the
return of his property. Such claims were to be settled later, as Congress
should direct.
Liquidation of Enemy Property. The power to liquidate was added in
March, 1918, by an amendment to section 12 of the Act 0 which author-
ized the Custodian to sell all property held by him as though he were its
absolute owner. To a great extent the power to liquidate enemy property
is also a logical consequence of attempts to make enemy property useful
for the war effort. A particular enterprise held by the Custodian may be
of no use to the war effort, while some of its equipment, or part of its
assets, may be greatly needed in other places. Thus the war effort requires
the breaking up of the enterprise. Other enemy investments such as real
property holdings or securities may be of no direct importance for the
war effort, but their sale and the reinvestment of the proceeds in govern-
ment securities would help to finance the war.
Liquidation of enemy property may, however, be motivated by pur-
poses of aggressive economic warfare. In 1917, the Custodian was par-
ticularly impressed by the fact that many Gerhan-owned enterprises were
engaged in the manufacture of necessaries of war, earning large profits
59.' Salamandra Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co., 254 Fed. 852, 859 (S. D.
N. Y. 1918).
60. 40 STAT. 460 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., § 12 (1940).
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"which would have to be turned over to the enemy after the war." "I
His feeling was that enterprises of this character should be sold, so that
the enemy claimant could, after the war, become entitled only to the pro-
ceeds of the sale and possibly to interest earned by the investment of these
moneys in Government securities. By such action there would be per-
manent destruction of the enemy's economic position, as it existed before
the war, in trade, shipping and banking, and in various industrial fields.
Whether Congress, in giving to the Custodian the power to sell seized
property "as though he were its absolute owner," meant to permit him
to liquidate the enemy's economic position in its entirety is a futile ques-
tion. The language of the amendment was sufficiently far-reaching to
permit such an interpretation, and it was construed accordingly. Subse-
quently, it was said that the amendments had transformed the Act "from
a purely conservation measure to one of action, final and drastic." Thus
it had become the purpose of the statute "to eliminate enemy ownership
of property in this country," "to place those properties in American
hands," and thereby to "strike a blow at the enemy in the darkest hour
of war." 6
The terms of the amendment restricted the Custodian in only one re-
spect. All sales were to be made at public auction after advertisement and
to the highest bidder. Sales to the United States were excepted.0 But
even such sales were held to be permissible only if made "for a fair and
just compensation." "4 This restriction was, therefore, important. It gave
assurance that liquidation would place in the hands of the Custodian
a substantial consideration for the property sold, amounting to the highest
price obtainable in the public market. Consequently, there still remained
for Congress the question of returning to the former owner, if it so de-
sired after the war, a fair compensation for his property.
Whether liquidation of enemy property is a regulatory measure, or
whether it amounts to confiscation, has never been determined. To some
extent, it may indeed be considered in the nature of a regulation only, at
least insofar as sales are required during a war for the public protection
against direct dangers.' However, this line is immediately overstepped
when liquidation takes place for purposes which reach far beyond any
immediate danger. A sale of enemy property merely because of a desire to
invest the proceeds in Government securities, like any act of aggressive
economic warfare, must, therefore, be considered to be an act of con-
fiscation.
6L United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191, 197 (C. C. A. 3d,
1925), 2nodified, 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
62. Id. at 205.
63. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., § 12 (1940).
64. 31 Ops. A7rr'y Gzx. 463 (1919) ; see also 32 Os. Ar' GEN. 577 (1921).
65. BORCHA2n, op. cit. supra note 51, at 256; Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property
(1941) 35 Am,. J. INT. LAw 243, 252.
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Requisitions in the National Interest. The amendment of March, 1918,
contained one additional clause which was destined to play an important
role. The Statute authorized sales without public auction in exceptional
cases when the President determined that the national interest required
such a special procedure. This provision was utilized by the Custodian
in a case involving the Chemical Foundation, a corporation- formed by
him for the purposes of his administration. Acting with the President's
permission, the Custodian sold to Chemical Foundation about 6,000
German and Austrian chemical patents for the nominal price of $50 each,
in order to enable Chemical Foundation to license the use of these patents
to American chemical manufacturers."
This was a pure measure of confiscation. It was recognized as such by
the courts, and it "vas justified by them because its avowed purpose was
to forestall any possibility that these rights might ultimately revert to the
enemy, to prevent the concentration of monopolistic powers in one hand
in case of a public sale, and to create an American chemical industry
"which [would stand] equipped, manned and maintained in full operation,
ready to be converted at once into a line of national defense in the event
of war." 07
Collective Liability for Enemy Debts. After World War I Congress
divided the property holdings of the Custodian into two separate groups.
One group comprised property which Congress did not intend to hold
any longer. It included the property of the following: American citizens
and friendly aliens who had resided in enemy country; enemy business
organizations which were owned by Americans or friendly aliens; all
those who lived in territories which at the end of the war were then ceded
by the enemy, such as Alsace-Lorraine, and the territory of the new suc-
cessor states, like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; residents of
enemy occupied territories, such as Belgium and Serbia; American born
and neutral women who had become enemy nationals as a result of mar-
riage to German or Austrian citizens; persons who, after having been re-
leased from war internment, decided to remain in this country; former
residents of the United States who returned to this country after the war;
and nationals of Bulgaria and Turkey, who had been allies of the enemy,
but never enemies themselves.0
The remaining property, that is, the property of Germans, Austrians
and Hungarians, was retained in a manner which requires a somewhat
66. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925),
mwdified, 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
67. Id. at 213.
68. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §9 (1940), as amended by 41 STAT. 35,
977 (1921), 42 STAT. 1511 (1923), 44 STAT. 406 (1926). See Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Finance on H. R. 15009, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927) (return of alien prop-
erty).
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detailed comment. In 1921 Congress declared that it intended to con-
tinue to hold German and Austro-Hungarian property as a pledge for the
satisfaction of American war claims." This intention was affirmed in the
German-American Peace Treaty 7" and in a subsequent treaty of August
10, 1922,71 by which a mixed claims commission was set up for the deter-
mination of American war claims. Subsequently, however, Congress, by
the so-called Winslow amendment,7 decided to return to enemy claimants
part of their property up to an amount of $10,000 per claimant, to pay
to them income accruing thereafter on retained property, not in excess of
$10,000 per year in the case of any claimant, and to return the property
of enemy concerns in which non-enemies owned interests of more than
50 per cent.
Finally, in 1928, the original intention of Congress was effectuated in
the Settlement of War Claims Act.73 This statute was the result of nego-
tiations with German claimants, the German Government. and American
claimants, and it met with their approval. The statute ordered the pay-
ment of 80 per cent of the German, Austrian and Hungarian claims. It
also provided for the payment by the United States of compensation ftur
the property of German citizens requisitioned during the war, and it
provided for the payment of American war claims against the three
countries in question. The Treasury was ordered to retain the income on
enemy property accrued before the Winslow amendment was adupted,
the remaining 20 per cent of the enemy claims, one-half of the compensa-
tion payable to German claimants, and certain payments due under the
Dawes plan. Enemy claimants were given interest-bearing certificates
which were to be redeemed with funds paid into the Treasury by Germany.
The statute was supplemented by the Debt Funding Agreement with Ger-
many, dated June 23, 1930, by which Germany agreed to pay 40,800,000
reichmarks in each year until 1981.1 This entire complicated procedure
functioned until 1934 when Germany defaulted and Congress adopted a
joint resolution by which it ordered the Custodian to release no further
property for the time being."'
The purpose of these Congressional measures in spite of their apparent
complexity does not require much clarification. Congress did have a
legitimate interest in trying to enforce the claims of its nationals against
the former enemy, and it decided to protect their interests as an incident
to the re-establishment of peace. From the viewvpoint of the individual
69. 42 STAT. 105 (1921).
70. 42 STAT. 1939 (1923).
71. 42 STAT. 2200 (1923).
72. 42 STAT. 1511 (1923), 50 U. S. C., App., §9 (1940),
73. 45 STAT. 254 (1928).
74. 48 STAT. 1267, 1268 (1934).
75. Ibid.
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enemy claimant, however, Congress committed an act of confiscation; for
his property was pledged for the satisfaction of claims of third persons
for whose debt he had never agreed to become liable. True, his property
was only mortgaged and held as security for these claims; his title was
otherwise fully restored. But subsequent events demonstrated that to the
extent of this mortgage he had actually lost his property.
Administrative Charges. Section 24, added by the amendment of March
4, 1923,"0 authorized the Custodian to pay the necessary expenses in-
curred by him in securing the possession, collection, or control of seized
property, or in protecting or administering it. Under this provisiqn the
Custodian retained from all amounts paid over to claimants a sum equal
to 2 per cent to cover general or administrative expenses of his office.7"
He also deducted special expenses such as the costs of the sale of property,
which could have amounted to sizeable sums."8
The nature of this measure depends on the purpose for which the
charges are made. Expenses incurred in administering and preserving
property may vell be said to be an incident to the Government's regu-
latory powers. Costs of sales may fall in the same category. They may,
however, be incurred in the course of a confiscatory sale, and in that case
their deduction from the proceeds of the sale is in itself an additional act
of confiscation.
LEGAL CONCEPTS
Capture on Land and General War Powers
A comparison between the 1862 Act and its 1917 successor reveals that
'they have little, if anything, in common. Their differences are so great
that the question arises whether the two statutes serve the same purpose
or emanate from the same legislative power.
Two separate war powers relating to property rights are granted to
Congress by the Constitution: the express power to make rules respecting
capture on land or water and the implied power over alien property which
is derived from the words "Congress may declare war" and embraces
the authority to prosecute such war "by all means and in any manner in
which war may be legitimately prosecuted, including any invasion of
property rights which is required for that purpose." '9 The Act of 1862
was an exercise of the express power to regulate captures on land, while
76. 42 STAT. 1511 (1923), 50 U. S. C., App., § 9 (1940). See Cummings v. Deutsche
Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft, 300 U. S. 115 (1937).
77. Woodson v. Deutsche Gold und Silber Scheideanstalt, 292 U. S. 449 (1934)
Escher v. Woods, 281 U. S. 379 (1930).
78. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74 (1935). In that case stock had
been sold for $20,000; "expenses of the sale" amounted to more than $16,000.
79. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870).
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the Act of 1917 was an exercise of those powers which are implied from
the general authority to declare war.
Capture on land or water is an institution which the drafters of the
Constitution assumed to be pre-existent. The Constitution specifically
restricts itself to authorizing Congress to make rules for effective ap-
plication of this right and does not expressly establish the right itself.
It is a belligerent right possessed by the United States, as by any sovereign
who becomes involved in a war, and it exists independently of any con-
stitutional delegation. The same situation obtains in the case of the
supplementary right of capture on water. For capture on water is equiva-
lent to the right to-take prizes, which has long been recognized as a sover-
eign right of any belligerent. With respect to the latter right no one
doubts that the Constitution merely adds to it a subsidiary power to es-
tablish proceedings for its enforcement.
The right of capture on land or water is nothing more than the ancient
right of the sovereign to appropriate enemy property. It is this right
which has been attacked consistently for centuries as a naked and im-
politic right, condemned by the judgment of modern times, and which
has been restricted successfully by the rules of international law to apply
only to those who are active participants in the enemies' warfare. The
Supreme Court in Miller v. United States"'o held that the Confiscation
Act of 1862 was an exercise of those belligerent rights which after war
has been declared the United States enjoys over its enemies within the
limits established by the rules of international law. And the Act applied
only to those property owners who by overt acts of treason had placed
themselves in a position of belligerence against the nation.
Nevertheless, an exercise by Congress of the power to make rules cun-
cerning capture does not require any specific justification. It is an express
legislative power and therefore absolute and unconditional. Whenever
Congress desires to put the right into effect, it can do so even if its sole
motive is to enrich the national treasury. Moreover, there is nothing in
the Constitution which requires Congress to delegate its authority to an
administrative agency to insure that confiscation will take place only in ap-
propriate cases. On the contrary, the Congressional power is absolute,
and Congress can order the indiscriminate capture of all enemy property
subject to this power.
The Confiscation Act clearly exemplified these incidents of the right
of capture. The Act provided for complete confiscation and forfeiture
of enemy property to the United States; it did not profess to pursue any
ulterior purpose beyond such forfeiture, and it made it the duty-not thu
privilege-of the President to seize any and all property to which the
terms of the Act applied.
The right of capture bears no relation tu the general war powers t.ver
alien property. The war powers are implied powers, and for that reason
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available only insofar as their exercise is necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose for which they are implied. Since they derive from the power of
Congress to declare war, they are limited to such measures as are neces-
sary to conduct a war. Wherever a confiscation of property is required for
that purpose, it is thus authorized; where less stringent measures, such
as licensing or sequestration, or partial confiscation only are sufficient,
these measures must be taken and confiscation is not permissible.
The 1917 statute fully met these requirements. It established a list
of authorized measures, such as sequestration, sale, liquidation, and con-
fiscatory sale of enemy property which could or could not be exercised.
Since the necessity for these measures varied from case to case, their im-
position was entrusted to the Office of Alien Property Custodian, a fact-
finding administrative agency which could exercise its discretion within
the limitations referred to.
In contrast to the right of capture, the general war powers bear no
relation at all to international law. Restrictions which may be established
by international law to protect non-combatants or others do not apply to the
war powers. In Littlejohn v. United States 80 there was involved a special
statute passed in 1917 under the general war powers which authorized
the President to take over possession and title of enemy ships in United
States harbors. The plaintiff urged the Court to read into the statute "the
recognized rules of international law designated to mitigate the horrors of
war." 8 The Court, however, refused to do so, and in indisputable con-
trast to the holding in Miller v. United States decided that "every govern-
ment may pursue what policy it thinks best concerning seizure and con-
fiscation of enemy ships in its harbors when war occurs." 82 Consequently,
a statute deriving from the general var powers, as against one which is
an exercise of the right of capture, may apply to any property which is
under the jurisdiction of the United States whenever measures against
such property are necessary for the war purpose; and it makes no difference
whether the property is owned by an enemy combatant, or an enemy who
is not engaged in hostilities, or by an alien friend, or even a citizen.
Within the scope of these powers, the 1917 statute applied to any
enemy, whether he was engaged in hostilities and subject to the laws of
war or was a peaceful citizen and exempted by international law from
the right of capture. It even applied to alien friends whose country had
been occupied by the enemy's armed forces, although their property, be-
yond any doubt, was not subject to the right of capture.
The distinction between the right of capture and the general war powers
is of considerable practical importance, for it opens the way for the courts
to review the validity of statutes and administrative acts which are de-
80. 270 U. S. 215 (1925).
81. Id. in 70 L. Ed. 553 (1925).
82. Littlejohn v. United States, 270 U. S. 215, 226 (1925).
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rived from these powers. On the basis of this distinction the courts are
able to apply two alternative standards to all invasions of alien property
rights and to demand that any such invasion comply with either one of the
two. The first standard is established by international law, which has re-
stricted the right to capture enemy property to the property of those
enemies who are engaged in hostilities. The second standard derives from
constitutional law and permits the taking of measures against any prop-
erty which is under the jurisdiction of the United States, but only to the
extent necessary for the war effort.
With respect to the latter standard, it is hardly necessary to add that
in accordance with the elementary canons of constitutional law, the courts
may not usurp the functions of the legislature and of administrative
agencies by determining the degree to which a particular measure appears
necessary for the war purpose. Only such legislative or administrative
acts which are in no way related to the legitimate end can be said to lie
unconstitutional. 83 And the purposes which are served by the war power
should be broadly defined in order to give Congress the greatest possible
leeway. The conduct of the war to a victorious finish does not exhaust
the legitimate war purposes. These purposes also include the re-establish-
ment of peace, and they may well be said to include the settlement of war
claims and reparations in the course of the re-establishment of peace and
possibly all kinds of military and economic post-war planning for the pre-
vention of future wars.
Even within these confines, however, the courts will have considerable
and far reaching opportunities to frustrate what Congress might wish to
do. For example, a court might declare the seizure and free use of patented
inventions owned by residents of enemy occupied countries which cannot
possibly be of direct service to the war effort beyond Congressional power
although the United States is willing to compensate the owner. And the
power of licensing patents of alien friends for a period beyond the war
emergency might also be said to be unauthorized by the Constitution.
Those cases which appear to be irreconcilable with the proposition that
the general war powers do not confer any absolute right of confiscation
are, on close analysis, compatible with this view. Brown v United States,'
the first in this line of cases, referred to the right of capture and not to the
general war powers in holding "that war gives to the sovereign full right
to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever
found." 85 Miller v. United States, holding that "the right to seize and
confiscate all property of an enemy. . . is and always has been an un-
88. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Legal Tender Ca-es,
12 Wall 457 (U. S. 1870).
84. 8 Cranch. 110 (U. S. 1814).
85. Id. at 122.
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doubted belligerent right," " interpreted the Confiscation Act of 1862
which is based on the right of capture and not on the general war powers.
Only a few of the cases decided under the 1917 Act contain any general
language concerning Congressional powers. Some of them expressly assert
that a seizure under the Act did not, or did not necessarily, amount to
confiscation. In Stoehr v. Wallace, 87 the Court restricted itself to assert-
ing "that Congress, in time of .war, may provide for the seizure and se-
questration" of enemy property without mentioning the powers of con-
fiscation. In Woodson v. Deutsche Gold,"' it was decided that pending
further action by Congress under section 12 "confiscation was not affected
or intended." Other cases related only to questions of jurisdiction and
held principally that full title to the seized property was in the hands of
the United States 89 and that no interest remained in the hands of the
former owner. 0 They, therefore, merely permit the inference that the
enemy owner, while the United States holds his property, has no interest
which entitles him to -a hearing in court, and they do not make it neces-
sary to assume that the Act brought about a confiscation of enemy prop-
erty. The United States alone may be empowered to protect the seized
property in all court proceedings, and still be said to hold the property
merely as a public administrator, and not as absolute owner.
A final group of cases did hold expressly that the United States has
absolute power to confiscate enemy property. These cases, however,
must be restricted to their facts. Thus the court in Kahn v. Garvan, find-
ing that enemies "are subject to the exercise of that power [of confis-
cation] without any legal limitations," "' actually confirmed only the
powers of Congress to permit the seizure of enemy property. And the
court even admitted that the case did not require any ruling on the powers
of confiscation by adding that "such seizure is in no sense a condemnation,
but merely a sequestration," and that "up to the present time in any case it
[the power of confiscation] has not been exercised to the full extent of con-
fiscation." 92 Similarly, in United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., a
the finding of the court that enemy property may be confiscated, merely
confirmed the acquisition by a Government subsidiary in an exceptional
statutory proceeding of a group of patents for the purpose of establishing
a vital defense industry. Finally, in Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 1 the
holding that under the statute alien enemies were divested of every right,
and that the United States acquired absolute title, carried out so far as
86. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305 (U. S. 1870).
87. 255 U. S. 239 (1920).
88. 292 U. S. 449 (1934).
89. Littlejohn v. United States, 270 U. S. 215 (1925).
90. White v. Mechanics Securities Corp.. 269 U. S. 283 (1925).
91. Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909, 916 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
92. Ibid.
93. 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
94. 300 U. S. 115 (1937).
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was necessary the purpose of retaining part of the enemy property as
security for American claims.
The Fifth Amendment
Generally speaking, the entire war powers of the Government are re-
stricted by the due process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth
Amendment, just as much as any other legislative power of C ingre;s.
In the case of the war powers, however, the courts have applied the Fifth
Amendment in a manner which is considerably less rigid than is custoim-
ary, apparently in order to meet the peculiar requirements of the war .itu-
ation.
The most outspoken example of this attitude is the willingness,if the
Supreme Court, in time of war, to permit military agencies to act first
and to establish compensation proceedings afterwards."' Anoother such
example is the willingness of the courts to uphold those provisions if the
1917 Act which permitted the summary seizure of property which the
Custodian found to be enemy owned, even though such property was ac-
tually the property of a citizen and even though the Custodian's coon-
clusions were "founded upon evidence which would [have appeared] to
[the] court to be unsatisfactory." " The courts consistently held that as
long as the seizure was a mere possessory procedure, permitting a citizen
subsequently to appeal to a court for redress, the Fifth Amendment was
not violated, and they found that sections 7c and 9a, permitting an actiin
against the Custodian by any claimant not an enemy satisfied this rctquirc-
mentY7 The decisions went even further, confirming the summary I\iwers
of the Custodian, even though in exercising them he obtained "a g,,,d
deal more than possession," namely, the power to sell the property as Iing
as no claimant appeared."' And beyond this, the courts decided that the
statute was valid, although it gave to a citizen-claimant whose irt ilerty wa-,
seized and sold before he filed his claim no more than the proiceeds frin
the sale. 9 Further than that, however, the courts refused to go. Thus.
it was held '" that the remedy given by sections 7c and Qa w4uld have
95. United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (U. S. 1871) ; see also In re Inland Water-
ways, 49 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1943).
96. Salamandra Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co., 254 Fed. 852, 857 (S. D.
N. Y. 1918).
97. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 (123) ; Stuehr -. Wallace, 2,5
U. S. 239 (1921); Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 t1921); Baltimwre
& Ohio R. R. v. Sutherland, 18 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Kahn v. Garvan, 20d
Fed. 909 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) ; Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New Yurk Life Ins. & Trust Co., 254
Fed. 852 (S. D. N. Y. 1918). See also Stern v. Newton, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1943, p. 519,
col. 7 (Sup. Ct).
98. Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921).
99. Sielcken-Schwartz v. American Factors, W0 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
100. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74 (1935).
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been inadequate if the Custodiarf had had the power to deduct his ex-
penses from the amount due a citizen-claimant.
Specific alien property legislation, passed under the general war powers,
can affect the property of a citizen only incidentally in the manner just
referred to. With respect to this kind of legislation, it is therefore much
more important to ascertain to what extent the Fifth Amendment protects
persons other than citizens.
As far as alien friends are concerned, this question has been clearly
settled in their favor in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States.
101
That case involved a United States Government corporation which, act-
ing under the statute of June 14. 1917, concerning alien ships,102 requi-
sitioned certain Russian ships which were then in the course of construc-
tion in the United States. The statute, which was based on the war powers,
had expressly permitted such confiscation, but had provided that just coin-
pensation was to be paid to the owner. Subsequently, the compensation
was ascertained by the Government, but was refused by the assignee of
the ship owner as unsatisfactory. The assignee, a Russian corporation,
thereupon sued the United States in the Court of Claims for the payment
of just compensation. The court decided that it lacked jurisdiction be-
cause of the provisions of section 155 of the Judicial Code 103 which ex-
cludes actions against the United States by aliens whose country does
not grant reciprocity. The Supreme Court decided that these provisions
should not have been read into the Act. It held that "the petitioner was
an alien friend and as such was entitled to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment" and that the Amendment is "a standard for our govern-
ment which the Constitution does not make dependent upon the standards
of other governments." 104 This holding was subsequently affirmed in
Becker Steel Company v. Cumnnings.'0 In that case the Court, for the
avowed purpose of preserving the constitutionality of the 1917 statute,
permitted a construction of sections 9a and 7c which was favorable to
non-enemy claimants. The Court held that in order to be constitutional,a
the statute must offer to non-enemy claimants a remedy adequate to assure
them the return of their property if improperly seized.
With respect to enemies, the question seems to be settled against them
by those various cases, previously discussed, which permitted certain acts
of confiscation against enemy property under the 1917 Act. 00 One of
these cases expressly held that the confiscation of enemy property was
101. 282 U. S. 481 (1931).
102. 40 STAT. 182 (1917).
103. 36 STAT. 1135 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §261 (1940).
104. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 492 (1931).
105. 296 U. S. 74 (1935).
106. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft, 300 U. S. 115 (1937)
Woodson v. Deutsche Gold und Silber Scheideanstalt, 292 U. S. 449 (1934); United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 6 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
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possible "by the exertion of the war power and [was] untrammelled by
the due process and just compensation clauses." 101
Alien Friends and Enemies.
The standard of necessity derived from the general purpose of the war
powers is, therefore, now supplemented, in the case of the property of alien
friends, by the requirements of due process and just compensation; while
in the case of enemies, these requirements do not apply. Thus the Fifth
Amendment constitutes the only dividing line between the property of
enemies and alien friends in this field of legislative action. Where alien
property legislation affects enemies, regulatory measures, as well as acts
of confiscation, are permissible to the extent required by the war effo-irt.
In the case of alien friends, regulatory measures are available to the same
extent as in the case of enemies, while confiscation requires just compen-
sation and due process.
This distinction, clear as it may- seem, is not easily applied to practical
situations because of the ambiguity of the terms "alien friend" and
"enemy." As used in the 1917 Act, these terms did not in any way con-
form to the meaning given them by the Court in the Russian [olnteer
Fleet case. A national of an enemy occupied country, for example, whicm
the 1917 statute considered to be an enemy,' "' must be held to be protected
by the Fifth Amendment by anyone who reads the apodictic language of
the Russian Volunteer Fleet case. After 1918, Congress solved this dilem-
ma by exempting from confiscation the property of so many groups of
alien owners that the remaining property was undoubtedly only property
of enemies in the narrower sense of the word.Y" Since then the term
"enemy" has become even more complex in its implications. Today, when
partisans and saboteurs work behind the enemy's ranks and when the
enemy himself regards large groups of his nationals as his own enemies,
the wisdom of a determination of enemy character simply on the basis
of nationality is questionable."'
The release of enemy property which Congress decreed after World
War I was accompanied by a resumption of the general discussion of the
entire alien property question. However, this discussion again proceeded
solely from the viewpoint of the law of nations, without consideration of
the limitations on domestic legislative powers. Most writers took the
position that the pre-war rule of international law, which established the
107. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellshaft, 310 U. S. 115, 120 (1937).
108. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §4a (1940).
109. See p. 762 infra.
110. Do=EE, TRADING WITH TEE ENEMY IN WORLD AR I (1943) 24-120; Biddle,
The Problem of Alien Enemies (1942) 3 FREE VORLD 201; Sommerich, loc. cit. sumia
note 20; Wilson, Treatment of Civilian Enemy Aliens (1943) 37 A:M. J. INT. L 30.
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inviolability of private property, was still in existence and that the policies
pursued by most participants in the war had not weakened the power of
this rule. John B. Moore, calling the practice pursued during the war a
"reversion to evil practices under righteous pretenses," "' claimed that
the war had not developed any new facts which could justify the violations
of enemy property that had taken place. He felt that previous wars had
been just as violent and just as sanguine as World War I. Edwin M.
Borchard pointed out that confiscatory policies tend to support the dis-
integration of the entire institution of private property.
112
The post-war administration fully supported these views. It was by
the direction of President Harding that the Government brought action to
nullify the confiscatory sale of patents to the Chemical Foundation.
11 3
Solicitor General Stone, arguing the case for the Government, requested
the Court in vain to condemn the sale as "subversive of the future of the
country." 114 Other Government representatives, discussing the post-war
policy of holding enemy property as security for American claims, care-
fully, though not quite logically, emphasized that nobody in Congress re-
garded this measure as "confiscatory in the ordinary sense of the word"
and that the administration by supporting it did not mean to advocate
any policy of confiscation."' As late as 1937, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull took the position that confiscation of enemy property is not in keep-
ing with the national practice, that it is harmful to American investors,
and that "the taking over of such property, except for a public purpose and
coupled with the assumption of liability to make just compensation, would
be fraught with disastrous results." 116
Similar attitudes were expressed in various international conferences.
The International Law Association in 1924 resolved that "it [was] for-
mally of the opinion that the revived practice of warring states, by which
they confiscate the valuable property of alien citizens, [was] a relic of
barbarism, worthy of the most severe condemnation." " The Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce took similar action.""
111. Moore, Fifty Years of International Law (1937) 50 HARV. L. REv. 395, 421; see
also MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924) 13-25.
112. Borchard, Enemy Private Property (1924) 18 Ai. J. INT. L. 523, 532,
113. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
114. Brief for Appellant, p. 499, United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d)
191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
115. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 13496,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922) 301, 313, cited, together with numerous similar statements,
in HAYS, ENEMY PROPERTY IN AMERICA (1923) 57.
116. Letter to Senator Capper, May 27, 1935, quoted in Borchard, Confiscations.
Extraterritorial and Domestic (1937) 31 AMx. J. INT. L. 675, 680.
117. Stockholm Conference of International Law Association, 1924, quoted in BITTrrE
AND ZELLE, No MORE WAR ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (1933) 75.
118. Resolution to Guarantee Property in Peace and War, World Conference of 1923,
quoted, id. at 77.
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Proposals for rules forestalling future recurrences of the practice were
legion. They ranged from a demand to codify the international law on
enemy property,' 19 and for a "Kellogg Pact for private property," -'
to demands for a series of bilateral treaties.' 2 ' The last mentioned pro-
posal was actually followed by the United States in a number of in-
stances.
1 22
Other writers, however, felt that modern warfare and changed coi-
nomic conditions had shown clearly that enemy property could nut be
left in the hands of its owners without interference. Their suggestion was
that the sequestration of enemy property should be permissible."
FIRST WAR POWERS ACT OF 1941
When the United States entered the second World War, the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917 was still on the books. However, it was not
apparent whether all of its terms could be applied to the new situatio ,n.
Some special provisions of the statute had already been invoked by the
President even before this country entered the war. These were the pr,,-
visions of section 5b,'2 4 which permitted the President, during any pVril 
of national emergency, as well as in time uf war. to regulate transactio ins
involving foreign exchange and foreign property rights. This had hken
used by the President between April. 1940, and July. 1Q4l, - tto estalish
the so-called "freezing control" of the Treasury over foreign a,-,vts.
Other provisions of the statute came into effect immediately as a result
of the declaration of war. Among them were section 3a, which prohibits
commercial intercourse with the enemy, and section 7b insofar as it stays
actions brought in our courts by enemy nationals. 2 No certainty existcd.
however, with respect to the most important provisions of the Act under
which the Custodian had operated during the last war. To som extent
they were undoubtedly only applicable to the specific situation which pre-
vailed in and after 1918. This was true. particularly in the case of sectit in
9 and 12 insofar as they arranged for the release of enemy property
119. GARNER, PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L., 27fl Ann. Meeting (1933) 118 el seq.
120. BIT=F AND ZELE, loC. cit. szpra note 117.
121. Borchard, Reprisals on Private Property (193to) 30 Ai. j. 1i. L. 103.
122. GmsoN, loc. cit. supra note 49.
123. GATHrNGS, loce. cit. supra note 25.
124. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), as amended by 48 ST.AT. 1 (1933), 54 STr. 17'4 t'1?40),
50 U. S. C., App., § 5b (1940).
125. ExEc. ORDER No. S3S9, 5 FED. REG. 1400 (1940), as amended; DocuMN;m Pru-
TAINING TO FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL (U. S. Treasury Dep't 1943). See TiIIESUG, CQ:;-
TROL OF FOREIGN OWNED PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
126. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §§ 3a, 7b (1940). See Davis, Trad:.,j asth
the Enemy, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 19, 1941, p. 2048, col. 1; E.r jarte Kumez, Kaxvatj, 317
U. S. 69 (1942) ; Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510 (1942).
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seized by the first Custodian. Section 7c, 27 which contained the core of
the Custodian's powers, was not expressly restricted to the first World
War situation, but it could well be said that this section was too closely
connected with other obsolete provisions to stand alone.
Congress aggravated rather than solved these problems when it adopted
the First War Powers Act in 19 4 1, -s since certain ambiguities in the new
statute raised problems of construction in addition to the old question of
determining the extent of legislative powers over alien property,
The First War Powers Act established entirely new powers for the
seizure of alien property, which it incorporated in section 51) of the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act. Under section 5b these powers are given not
necessarily to an Alien Property Custodian, but to such person or agency
as the President may designate; they are available not only during the
time of war, but also during any other period of national emergency;
they can be made to apply without distinction to the property not only
of enemies, but of any foreign government or national; their exercise
results not only in the transfer of possession, but in the "vesting" of the
property in question in the designated person or agency; and any prop-
erty thus vested may be "held, used, administered, liquidated, sold or other-
wise dealt with in the interest and for the benefit of the United States.
''tl2
These terms are very far reaching. Stretched to their limits they would
even cover the vesting and subsequent liquidation of the property of our
closest allies during any time of national emergency, a possibility which
was hardly contemplated by Congress. Whether such an extreme inter-
pretation of the statute is at all feasible need not be decided for our pur-
poses. We are concerned with the vesting powers only to the extent to
which they have actually been put into effect. So far this -has been done
only once-by the President's Executive Order 9095.1"0
Executive Order 9095 designates a newly established Office of Alien
Property Custodian as the recipient of the vesting powers, and it author-
izes the new Custodian to vest six certain classes of property rights and
no more. Three of these classes refer exclusively to enemy property.
Taken together, they comprise all enemy property within the jurisdiction
of the United States, with the exception of cash and securities which are
left under the freezing control of the Treasury. The remaining three
classes comprise a number of property rights of non-enemy aliens, namely,
patents, copyrights and trade-marks, ships, and business enterprises. Alien
patents, copyrights and trade-marks, as well as ships, are subjected, un-
127. 40 STAr. 411, 460 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §§ 7c, 9, 12 (1940).
128. 55 STAT. 838 (1941), 50 U. S. C., App., §§ 611-22 (Supp. 1942).
129. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §2a (1940).
130. EXEC. ORDER No. 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended by ExEC. OuDiw
No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
[Vol. 52 : 739
CONFISCATION OF ENEMY PROPERTY
conditionally, to the vesting powers. Alien business enterprises may be
vested only if "the national interest" so requires.
Section 5b, taken together with Executive Order 9095. furnishes cer-
tain new definitions of persons who are to be considered enemies. Under
the Act of 1917, enemy status was based on residence within either the
enemy territory itself or any territory occupied by the military or naval
forces of the enemy.13' Under the amended section 5b, residence is no
longer the decisive factor. The statute makes use of the more elastic
term "national" which was defined, in a previous Executive Order estab-
lishing the freezing regulations,1 32 as comprising not only residents of
the enemy country, but also persons acting or purporting to act for the
benefit of the enemy and "any other person who there is reasonable cause
to believe" is a national as defined in that Executive Order.
Persons within enemy occupied territory are no longer necessarily tse
be considered enemies. They are non-enemy nationals unless they are
citizens of an enemy country, or controlled by or acting on behalf of an
enemy, or "the national interest" requires that they be treated as enemies.
Aliens who live neither in enemy territory, nor enemy occupied territory,
may be considered as enemy nationals only if they are controlled by or
acting on behalf of the enemy, or if the national interest of the United
States requires that they be treated as enemy nationals. In other words,
mere enemy citizenship is not a sufficient ground for the vesting of prop-
erty under the Executive Order
This new arrangement should be welcomed because it endeavors to
protect the property of those victims of enemy aggression which it has
been found unnecessary to seize.' 33 Unfortunately, however, it has nut
been followed in practice. For the Custodian has vested all patents ,,f
nationals of enemy occupied countries, along with those of the enemy,
without examining whether each particular patent is required to be vested
in the national interest.
Nature of Vesting Powers
A very stimulating attempt to establish the nature of these vesting
powers and their relation to the old act has been made by J. F. Dulles.'
The analysis set forth by him is apparently motivated by the radical use
which the Custodian has made of the vesting powers in the case of alien
131. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §2a (1940).
132. ExEc. OnRzm No. 8389, 5 FED. REG. 1400 (1940), as amended by Suctitn Se,
EXEc. ORDER No. 8785, 6 FED. REG. 2898 (1941).
133. Except with respect to section 5b, the definitions uf t-ctiun 2 are still in furce;
Drewry v. Onassis, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 17, 1942, p. 1496, cul. 3.
134. Dulles, The I'estng Power of the Alien Properls, Cstion (1943) 28 CoaN.
L. Q. 245.
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owned patents. Dulles suggests that in view of the applicability of the new
provisions to any alien, friendly or enemy, and in view of their avail-
ability not only in wartime, but also in times of national emergency,
they cannot possibly derive from any right to confiscate enemy property.
He also excludes the possibility that they are an exercise of the general
governmental powers of eminent domain because no specific use by the
United States of vested property is indicated in the statute and because
the Act does not comply with certain other typical requirements of emi-
nent domain statutes. Dulles continues by emphasizing the close connec-
tion which exists between vesting powers and freezing control, both of
which are contained in the same sentence of section 5b. He concludes
that vesting powers are given solely to assure the effectiveness of freezing
control-by placing some of the property which is subject to that control
into the hands of a public administrator.
The result of this contention would be that vesting powers do not per-
mit any confiscatory acts but only regulatory measures in aid of the freez-
ing control. If this were true, the Custodian would have to be satisfied
with the position of a mere sequestrator. The language of the statute is
not incompatible with these conclusions, for the powers to liquidate, sell
and otherwise deal with vested property which, according to the statute,
are given to the Custodian, can be assumed to have been given to him only
for the purpose of preserving the values which are in his hands. Of course,
a considerable number of steps which the Custodian has already taken
(and foremost among them are the patent policies adopted by him which
result in a destruction of values rather than in their preservation) would
appear under this interpretation to exceed his legitimate powers.
This construction of the statute does not, however, do justice to the
requirements of the war situation and is contrary to the apparent intention
of Congress. If the statute permitted nothing but the sequestration of
vested property, confiscatory acts would not even be allowed where the
war effort necessitates the use of alien property, and it would make no
difference if this country were perfectly willing to pay just compensation
to the alien owner. This result can hardly be said to be desirable in the
case of property owned by alien friends although such property, if actually
needed, could at least be taken under those war statutes which permit the
taking of property of citizens, 3 ' and on the same terms as those which
apply to citizen owners. But the result would be entirely inadequate insofar
as vesting powers apply to enemy property. None will doubt that Con-
gress intended to make enemy property available for the war effort to the
extent permitted under the Constitution. For all of these reasons it would,
135. Property Requisition Act, 55 STAT. 742, 50 U. S. C., App., §§ 611-22 (Stipp.
1942), as amended by the Second War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 156, 50 U. S. C., App.,
§§632, 636 (Supp. 1942).
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therefore, be preferable to assume that Congress in section 5b did estab-
lish powers which are elastic enough both to provide for the necessary use
of enemy property and to furnish to alien friends that degree of protection
to which they are entitled.
This assumption is supported by the. fact that vesting powers were
established by the First War Powers Act, the title of which indicates that
it was meant to be an exercise of the war powers of Congress. The only
open question is whether the vesting powers are an exercise of the absu-
lute right of capture or of the more limited general war powers over alien
property. In view of the comparison between the Confiscation Act of 1862
and the Trading with the Enemy Act, it is apparent that the vesting puwers
cannot convey any unlimited right of confiscation. For this right of con-
fiscation cannot possibly apply to the property of non-enemies, while both
section 5b and Executive Order 9095 permit the vesting of non-enemy
property. Vesting powers do, however, meet the tests which have been
established for alien property legislation based on the general war powers
of Congress. They are delegated to a fact finding administrative agentcy
which may exercise its discretion in applying them. They permit a series
of different measures against vested property, none of which result in
the final forfeiture of the property to the United States. The vesting
powers are, therefore, restricted by the limited purposes of the general war
power in the same manner in which the powers given to the Custodian
by the- 1917 Act were restricted. Consequently, they must be held to
authorize the Custodian to take only such measures as are necessary for
the successful pursuit of the war effort and for the re-establishment of
peace.
This relative character of the vesting powers has found a certain neas-
ure of recognition in the language employed in Executive Order 9095 and
in the Custodian's own regulations and vesting orders. In some of the
cases in which the President delegates discretionary powers to the Cus-
todian, and in most cases in which the Custodian exercises such discretion
under his authority, express reference is made to the national or the public
interest. Under Executive Order 9095 13' business enterprises owned by
alien friends may be vested if the Custodian determines that this action
is "necessary in the national interest," and the property of nationals of
enemy occupied countries may be vested if the national interest of the
United States requires such action. The Custodian's General Order 26 'I
claims that "the public interest requires" that vested property be liquidated
and sold in certain ways. His Vesting Order 1 ... states "that the action
136. Exc. OaER No. 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended by ExEc. ORa
No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
137. 8 FED. REG. 7628 (1943).
138. 7 FED. REG. 1046 (1942).
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herein taken is in the public interest." The same findings are contained
in subsequent vesting orders. At present the term used in these orders
is "deeming it necessary in the national interest." 119 Such findings are
made in the case of the vesting of any kind of property which is subject to
vesting powers, whether or not Executive Order 9095 requires the ex-
istence of a national interest. The only exception is made in orders vesting
property in the course of liquidation. 140 This consistent invocation of the
national interest would appear to be entirely unnecessary if the vesting
powers were based on any absolute right of confiscation.
The vesting powers, like any other legislation concerning alien property,
are subject to the due process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth
Amendment insofar as they apply to property of alien friends. Unfor-
tunately, the First War Powers Act does not take pains to provide for
a full compliance with the requirements of these two constitutional pro-
visions.
The new statute itself does not open the courts to a party aggrieved
by a vesting order. If any recourse to the courts exists at all, it can only
be derived from the terms of the 1917 Act. Section 9a of that Act
authorized-any person not an enemy, or an ally of an enemy, to claim "any
interest, right, or title" in property seized by the Custodian, and it pro-
vided that an action to establish such interest, right, or title might be
brought in the district courts.' Section 5b, in its amended forum, does
not contain any similar provision. The question is, therefore, whether
section 9a can be said to apply to the vesting of property under section 5b.
The Custodian answers this question in the negative.142 He maintains that
the courts have no jurisdiction to hear claims to vested property. If that
were so, the statute would be unconstitutional, not only because it would
deny due process to alien friends, but also because it would have the same
effect upon citizens whose property the Custodian may have mistakenly
found to be subject to his powers. The argument which is advanced in
favor of the Custodian's assertion is that if section 9a permits any person
not an enemy "to get back his property, if vested under 5b," "the clearly
intended scope of 5b is drastically curtailed"; and it is added that the lan-
guage of 9a, adopted in 1917, should not be used to defeat the specific
139. See VESTING ORDER No. 1508, 8 FED. REG. 10526 (1943).
140. See VESTING ORDER No. 1805, 8 FED. REG. 10313 (1943).
141. 40 STAT. 41"1 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App., §9a (1940).
142. Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215, 216 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The
Custodian argues that the powers to seize enemy property under the old Trading with the
Enemy Act have been repealed by implication because section 5b of the First War Powers
Act carries its own punitive provisions disregarding the fact that section 16 of the old Act
did provide for criminal sanctions.
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intention of Congress expressed in section 5b, in 1941, to go beyond the
limitations of the 1917 Act.'
43
This argument is not convincing. Opening the courts to a non-enemy
claimant does not necessarily mean that the vested property must be re-
turned to him if he can prove his non-enemy character. That may have
been true under the 1917 statute which permitted the seizure of enemy
property only. In the case of a vesting under section 5b, however, it can
well be said that section 9a merely establishes jurisdiction to hear non-
enemy claimants and does not compel the court, in granting relief, to sur-
render the property to the claimant. If the Constitution does not waryrant
the vesting of the property at all, then it should of course be returned;
if, however, the non-enemy claimant can only object to the taking of cer-
tain measures against his property by the Custodian. then the court should
grant such relief as is appropriate to the situation. True, section 9a ex-
pressly said that the court should order the retransfer of property and
did not expressly authorize any other form of relief. However, a broad
interpretation of the statute is indicated. For "acts of Congress are to
be construed and applied in harmony with, and not to thwart, the purpose
of the Constitution." '44
The same conclusion has already been reached in a case decided in a
district court in New York. 4 In that case the Custodian had found that
the capital stock of a New York corporation, which was registered in the
name of a citizen, was actually held by the latter for the benefit of a
German corporation. On the basis of these findings the Custodian had
vested the stock, dismissed the stockholder of record from his position
as president, and was proceeding to liquidate the corporation. The motion
of the Custodian to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was
denied. The court held that section 9a did apply. It stated that 5b and 9a
are not incompatible because an alien claimant, even though he can prove
that he is not an enemy, need not necessarily succeed in obtaining pos-
session of the property. Apparently these words were meant to say that
non-enemy claimaints, although given their day in court, will not recover
their property if the action taken by the Custodian against the property is
warranted by section 5b.
Section 5b also fails to make provision for the payment of just com-
pensation to alien friends whose property is confiscated. Again the statute
must be interpreted in a manner which will save its constitutionality. A
143. Dulles, loc. cit. supra note 134.
144. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74 (1935); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931): Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341
(1927).
145. Judge Bondy, in Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. X. Y.
1943); see also Stern v. Newton, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1943, p. 519, col. 7 (Sup. C0),
which presupposes the availability of a recourse to the courts.
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recent article by Turlington 146 suggests such an interpretation. He pro-
poses that section 5b should be considered to contemplate subsequent
provisions for the payment of compensation to non-enemies and for the
payment of either compensation or credit against claims to enemies or
enemy governments.14' Turlington feels that such provisions should now
be prescribed either by the President, or, preferably, by Congress. The
only objection which could be made to this suggestion is that the courts
have held, in the case of eminent domain statutes, that the law as it exists
at the time when property is taken must make provisions for the ascertain-
merit and payment of compensation within a reasonable period of time.1 '
However, section 5b is not an eminent domain statute. It stems from
the war powers, and, as we have already seen, in the case of war power
statutes the Supreme Court has applied the standards of the Fifth Amend-
ment in an elastic manner which permits some consideration of the pe-
culiar circumstances of the war situation.'49 In the light of these rulings,
it may well be said that the failure of Congress to insert at the outset
provisions for compensation into section 5b does not make the statute
unconstitutional. During the hectic first days of the war, when section
5b was amended, immediate and effective action was the primary problem
for the legislature. Moreover, most of the persons affected by the statute
would not have been in a position, and will not be in a position while the
war lasts, to take part in any compensation proceedings. There existed,
therefore, ample reason to postpone until later the establishment of com-
pensation proceedings.
During the time which has elapsed since December, 1941, the Cus-
todian's office has accomplished, with admirable energy and efficiency,
the great task of vesting and collecting a considerable amount of enemy
holdings. The time may now have come for Congress to examine the
results of this work and to reconsider the policies under which the Cus-
todian is to manage his holdings. A number of pressing problems await
Congressional determination. Foremost among them are the problems of
providing due process and just compensation for alien friends and of
establishing policy standards by which the administration will have to
abide.
146. Turlington, loc. cit. supra note 20.
147. An interpretation of section 5b, as authorizing the final disposal of vested prop-
erty by the President or the Custodian might conceivably be held to constitute an im-
proper delegation of authority by Congress. See Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S.
495 (1935) ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) ; United States v. Von
Clemm, 1 CCH 1943 War Serv. 9131 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) (discussing the Treasury Regu-
lations).
148. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380 (1895).
149. Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909, 914, 916 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
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